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Abstract
In many application areas—lending, education,
and online recommenders, for example—fairness
and equity concerns emerge when a machine
learning system interacts with a dynamically
changing environment to produce both immedi-
ate and long-term effects for individuals and de-
mographic groups. We discuss causal directed
acyclic graphs (DAGs) as a unifying framework
for the recent literature on fairness in such dy-
namical systems. We show that this formulation
affords several new directions of inquiry to the
modeler, where causal assumptions can be ex-
pressed and manipulated. We emphasize the im-
portance of computing interventional quantities
in the dynamical fairness setting, and show how
causal assumptions enable simulation (when en-
vironment dynamics are known) and off-policy
estimation (when dynamics are unknown) of in-
tervention on short- and long-term outcomes, at
both the group and individual levels.
1. Introduction
How do we design fair policies for complex, evolving sys-
tems? Recently, the literature on fairness in dynamical
systems has begun exploring the role of algorithmic systems
in shaping their environments over time (Hashimoto et al.,
2018; Lum & Isaac, 2016; Ensign et al., 2018). The key
insight from these papers is that the repeated application
of algorithmic tools in a changing environment can have
fairness implications in the long-term distinct from those in
the short-term.
However, the methods in this literature are quite disparate,
with little overlap existing between various works in terms
of modeling choices, goals, or assumptions. This lack of
formal similarity is surprising, given that these papers are
usually structurally alike: each proposes a dynamics model
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for a particular domain (e.g. lending (Mouzannar et al.,
2019), hiring (Hu & Chen, 2018), recommendations (Boun-
touridis et al., 2019)), exposes unfairness that arises from
long-term usage of some baseline policy, and then proposes
a “fair” policy to mitigate some of these biases.
In this paper, we propose unifying the literature on fairness
in dynamical systems via causal directed acyclic graphs
(DAGs) (Pearl, 2009; Richardson & Robins, 2013). While
causal DAGs have been used to study one-shot fair decision-
making (Kusner et al., 2017; 2019; Kilbertus et al., 2017),
they are uncommon in fairness settings involving sequential
decisions. We show that several intuitive models of long-
term unfairness are naturally expressed using causal DAGs.
We also show that causal reasoning is useful for analyzing
models and evaluating policies for these problems.
Our contributions are:
• We show that causal DAGs are a unifying framework
for the literature on fairness in dynamical systems,
reformulating examples from the literature using struc-
tural causal models and policy interventions.
• We demonstrate empirically that when environment dy-
namics are unknown, causal reasoning can help utilize
observational data to improve off-policy estimation and
learning.
• We show that if dynamics are known, causal DAGs
serve as flexible simulators for analyzing policies and
models, through extending and investigating model
assumptions.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce key
background concepts of structural causal models and policy
interventions. In Section 3, we demonstrate the application
of causal DAGs to several key concepts in the fairness in
dynamical systems literature. In Section 4 we discuss related
work in fairness and causality. In Section 5 we empirically
demonstrate that causal modelling can improve off-policy
estimation and selection in a dynamical fairness problem,
and in Section 6 we show how the explication of underlying
causal assumptions enables model extension and analysis.1
1 Code at github.com/ecreager/causal-dyna-fair
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Figure 1: Treatment model expressed as PGM (1a), SCM (1b), and
SCM under atomic (1c) and policy interventions (1d).
2. Background
2.1. Structual Causal Models
There are several ways of encoding causal assumptions in
DAG form. In this paper, we focus on structural causal mod-
els (SCMs) (Pearl, 2009), which we overview here.2 SCMs
are similar to probabilistic graphical models (PGMs) (Koller
& Friedman, 2009). They consist of nodes (random vari-
ables representing entities in the world) and edges (relation-
ships between entities). However, whereas PGMs only spec-
ify a set of conditional independence relationships, SCMs
specify a unique data generating process (analogously, a par-
ticular probability factorization, as opposed to the multiple
isomorphic factorizations available in a PGM).
There are two types of nodes in SCMs. Endogenous nodes
represent variables of interest within the model, while ex-
ogenous nodes are external random variables, representing
the exclusive source of stochasticity induced on the observa-
tions (the endogenous nodes). The edges between nodes are
deterministic functions called structural equations. Hence,
a setting of the exogenous nodes corresponds to exactly one
setting of the endogenous nodes. In Figure 1b, the dark
squares are endogenous nodes, representing specific entities
such as a credit score, a medical treatment, or a sensitive
attribute. The light circles are exogenous nodes. Each en-
dogenous node is the output of a structural equation, e.g.
T = fT (X,UT ), Y = fY (T,X,UY ).
We can calculate causal quantities under a particular SCM
by using the do-operator. Given the probability distribution
implied by the SCM in Figure 1b (call the modelM and the
implied joint distribution p), we may wish to ask – "What
would be the expected value of Y if T were set to 1?" The
corresponding estimand can be denoted Epdo(T=1) [Y ]. This
differs from the more straightforward conditional probabil-
ity Ep[Y |T = 1], which describes co-occurences of Y with
T = 1 in the observed data. The expression Epdo(T=1) [Y ]
2 Other overviews of various levels of detail can be found
elsewhere (Pearl, 2009; Madras et al., 2019; Buesing et al., 2019) .
indicates that expected value of Y is computed under a mod-
ified SCM which is specified by do(T = 1); we denote
thisMdo(T=1), with the associated probability distribution
pdo(T=1).Mdo(T=1) is intended to simulate a randomized
experiment — if the true data-generating process is repre-
sented byM, what would happen to the observed data if we
forcibly change the data-generating process, so that T = 1
always? Graphically,Mdo(T=1) is created by starting with
M (Fig. 1b), removing from the graph all the incoming ar-
rows to T (in this case, arrows originating from X and UT ),
and setting T = 1 (yielding Fig. 1c). This is referred to as
an intervention. Under certain conditions (Pearl, 2009), we
can identifyEpdo(T=1) [Y ] by using observational data gener-
ated by p to simulate sampling from pdo(T=1). Intervening
on the value of T in this way is an atomic intervention.
2.2. Policy Interventions and Off-Policy Evaluation
Alternatively, we can intervene directly on the struc-
tural equation governing T (Fig. 1d), resulting in model
Mdo(fT→pi) with distribution pdo(fT→pi). When an inter-
vention manipulates a structural equation corresponding to
a decision maker’s policy, we call this a policy intervention.
Accordingly, we denote the structural equation under inter-
vention as pi to emphasize that it represents the decision
maker’s policy, distinct from the structural fT present dur-
ing the previous collection of observational data (which in
turn could also be referred to as a policy, say fT = piHist).
Consider an observational dataset generated by some his-
torical policy piHist. We may wish to know the expected
outcome for some policy pi 6= piHist, but cannot directly test
pi in the world ourselves. This off-policy evaluation problem
is particularly important in fairness contexts, where running
a candidate policy in the world is frequently impossible
due to ethical or practical reasons. In an SCM, off-policy
evaluation constitutes estimating expected outcomes under a
policy intervention. In the example from Fig. 1d, to estimate
the expected value of Y under a new policy pi, we specify
our intervention with do(fT → pi), and the estimand would
be Epdo(fT→pi) [Y ]. In general, to denote the expected value
of a variable U under a target policy pˆi which intervenes on
a variable V , we write Epdo(fV→pˆi) [U ].
2.3. Benefits of Causal Graphs
While there are a variety of strategies for modeling in the
causal inference literature (the potential outcomes frame-
work of Rubin (2005) is a popular alternative3), we believe
that causal graphs as pioneered by (Pearl, 2009) convey
several benefits of particular interest in applications with
fairness concerns. We outline these benefits below.
3 We note that SWIGs (Richardson & Robins, 2013), while
not the focus of this work, provide a graphical method to express
potential outcomes that could also used to study long-term fairness.
Causal Modeling for Fairness in Dynamical Systems
Visualization Many problems in long-term fairness have
a large number of variables, and require collaboration
across disciplines and with policy makers or regulators.
Graphical structure allows for mathematical manipulation
of many variables, and can convey basic assumptions to
non-technical stakeholders.
Introspection Using causal language to be explicit about
assumptions is useful for learning better policies (we discuss
one such example in Sec. 5). Using a graph to convey the
causal assumptions is a stylistic choice, but it facilitates the
interrogation of complex assumptions (with many variables).
Since the usefulness of causal inferences often rests assump-
tions that cannot be readily tested, it is especially important
to hold these assumptions to a high degree of scrutiny; the
use of graphs to convey causal assumptions could empower
non-technical stakeholders to participate in this process.
Evaluation Causal graphs convey a number of method-
ological benefits, especially in improving off-policy evalua-
tion (Sec. 5), enabling expressive simulation, and suggesting
relevant sensitivity analyses (Sec. 6). Furthermore, encoding
causal assumptions using graphical language exposes an un-
derlying computation graph. Under mild assumptions, the
topology of a computation graph can be used to programati-
cally derive a large family of estimators for use in off-policy
evaluation and gradient-based policy learning (Schulman
et al., 2015; Weber et al., 2019). In the context of causal
inference, graph topology can assist in determining the iden-
tifiability of policy interventions from observational data;
see discussion of “dynamic treatment regimes” by Hernán
& Robins (2020) for further detail.
3. Causal Interpretations of Dynamic
Fairness Models
In this section, we demonstrate how SCMs present a uni-
fying framework for the literature on fairness in dynamical
systems. We focus on how causal mechanisms enable easier
explication of underlying modeling assumptions, yielding
insight into the component parts of the model, types of bias
which could arise, and the effects of hypothetical interven-
tions. Our aim is not to promote a particular dynamical
model or fairness objective/constraint, either in general or
for specific problem domains; rather we aim to provide a
tool with which policymakers and practitioners alike can
analyze a long-term unfairness problem. We discuss SCM
formulations of three models of fairness in dynamical sys-
tems (see Appendix D for several more examples):
1. Fair-MDP: a motivating example showing how bias
can arise in a generic sequential decision process.
2. Lending: Liu et al. (2018)’s single-step model of a loan
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Figure 2: The Fair-MDP: a motivating example model for estimat-
ing questions of fairness in sequential decision-making problems.
application.
3. Repeated classification: Hashimoto et al. (2018)’s
model of the dynamics of a changing population’s pref-
erences with unobserved sensitive attributes.
3.1. Fair-MDP: A Motivating Example
We begin by suggesting a minimal characterization of a
sequential decision process in the fairness setting. Consider
the following SCM (see Fig. 2), with the factorization:
A = fA(UA)
X0 = fX0(A,UX0)
T k = fT (X
k, A, UTk), k = 0 . . .K
Xk+1 = fX(X
k, T k, A, UXk+1), k = 0 . . .K
(1)
This is similar to a Markov Decision Process (MDP), in
that the key elements are states (X), actions (T ), a policy
(fT ) and a transition function (fX ). However, we note that
it is not fully Markovian — the sensitive attribute persists
across states, affecting all aspects of the problem. This
aligns with standard fairness intuitions, since the sensitive
attribute is generally considered to be somewhat holistic
and immutable by T . We denote this model the Fair-MDP,
since it becomes an MDP when we condition on the sensitive
attribute, and the inclusion of this attribute permits fairness
considerations.4 We can think of X as some feature of an
individual, which our policy is aiming to maximize, and
consider the final Xk in the sequence as the reward.
We can use this model to examine different fairness
issues in the sequential setting. For instance, con-
sider the issue of feeback loops (Ensign et al., 2018;
4 In general, MDPs are typically used to define all relevant
variables as part of a “state”, and methods from this literature can
be applied to long term fairness problems. Causal graphs enable
fine-grained modeling of the dynamics with a state (see Fig. 12
in Appendix D for one such example), which can be practically
useful in long-term fairness problems, e.g. in improving off-policy
evaluation (Sec. 5).
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Lum & Isaac, 2016). Suppose that the initial feature
distribution P (X0|A) is uneven: E[X0|A = 1] >
E[X0|A = 0]. Additionally, suppose a threshold pol-
icy is applied, with T k = fT (Xk, ·, ·) = 1(Xk > τ) and
that the application of the treatment causes X to increase:
E(Xk+1|Xk, T k = 1) > Xk (and T k = 0 causes the op-
posite effect). Then, we might expect to see a feedback
loop, as observed in Ensign et al. (2018), where one group’s
average reward increases continuously over time, and the
other group’s decreases.
Off-policy estimation for a policy pi in this model amounts
to estimating Epdo(fT→pi) [X
K ]. We note that this is a non-
trivial problem — if we only observe data generated by some
historical policy piH 6= pi, then the values of XK under the
actions that pi would have taken may not be available in
our data. In this case, the naive estimator Ep[XK ] will be
biased. We return to the off-policy estimation question in
Section 5, with a causal approach.
3.2. Lending
We turn to the model from Liu et al. (2018), which examines
threshold-based classification in general, but with specific
focus on the lending setting. Our SCM formulation of this
model can be seen in Figure 4a. In this model, a person with
group membership (a.k.a. sensitive attribute) A receives
a credit score X , and applies to a bank for a loan. The
bank makes a binary decision T about whether to award
the loan using the policy fT . The binary potential outcome
Y is realized, which is converted to institutional profit or
loss only if T = 1.5 Finally, the applicant’s credit score
is modified to X˜ (increased on repayment, decreased on
default, static if T = 0).6 The bank’s utility is measured
through their profit U (a sum over the individual profits u)
as well as the expected score change ∆j , representing the
average change in credit score after one time-step among
members of group A = j. Varying the loan policy can
achieve different values of U ,∆j , resulting in outcomes
with different fairness properties.
Liu et al. (2018) consider the effect of various threshold
policies for loan assignment under this model, namely the
expected values of U and ∆ for some policies with group-
specific thresholds τ , (τ0, τ1) that offer loans to applicants
of group j with score X if and only if their credit score
X > τj . They show that different thresholds satisfy dif-
ferent criteria: maximum profit (MAXPROF), demographic
parity (DEMPAR), and equal opportunity (EQOPP). In the
language of our paper, comparing threshold policies is done
5 Therefore this model does not capture a notion of opportunity
loss for not extending a loan to applicants who are qualified.
6 Likewise, the applicant’s score does not change in the absence
of a loan; this assumption may be inaccurate, since not receiving a
loan could create additional financial issues for the applicant.
through policy evaluation and intervention. Denoting by
piτ a threshold policy per group τ , these results can be
phrased with the tool of policy intervention: we evaluate the
policy piτ by estimating the quantities Epdo(fT→piτ ) [U ] and
Epdo(fT→piτ ) [∆j ] ∀j, for various τ computed under different
fairness criteria. We discuss off-policy evaluation in this
model in Section 5.
This SCM interpretation suggests several potential exten-
sions, such as evaluating outcomes over multiple steps or
adding extra actors to the model. We discuss these in detail
in Section 6, where we provide a case study of this SCM.
3.3. Repeated Classification
Finally, we examine the repeated classification setting dis-
cussed by Hashimoto et al. (2018), presented in SCM form
in Figure 3. The model is fairly general, and the authors
discuss several domains where it could apply (e.g. speech
recognition, text auto-completion). A binary classifier with
parameters θ is repeatedly trained on a population of in-
dividuals with features X and labels Y . The population
distribution is a mixture of components P =
∑
k αkPk,
where each of the k demographic groups has proportion αk
(with
∑
k αk = 1) and a unique distribution over the input-
output pairs Pk(X,Y ). Group memberships (i.e. cluster
assignments) Z ∈ [1 . . . k] are not observed.
The key idea is that the group distributions Pk remain static
over time, but their relative proportions αk change dynami-
cally in response to the classifier performance on the k-th
group. At the t-th step, the classifier is trained on the over-
all population {(Xti , Y ti )}, yielding classifier parameter θt
N 0bk
λ0k
α0kPk R
0
k
Z0
X0 Y 0
U 0θ θ
0
Yˆ 0
N 1bk
λ1k
α1kPk R
1
k
Z1
X1 Y 1
U 1θ θ
1
Yˆ 1
K
N0
K
N1
Figure 3: SCM for the repeated loss minimization model discussed
by Hashimoto et al. (2018). The dotted arrows highlight the policy
as the learning algorithm that produces parameters θt, which in
turn affect the predictions Yˆ ti . See Table 2 for explanation of all
symbols and text for description.
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and predictions7 Yˆ t. At each step, some subjects choose to
stay in the population, some choose to leave, and some new
subjects are added to the pool. In particular, the Poisson
parameter λk (proportional to mixing coefficient αk) is com-
puted as a function of the per-group risk Rk. Misclassified
subjects are more likely to leave, so under-served groups
shrink over time. The authors coin this phenomenon as dis-
parity amplification. Interestingly, disparity amplification
can improve the overall loss/accuracy since the shrinking
minority group (whose accuracy may be decreasing) con-
tributes less to these global metrics as time proceeds. To
mitigate disparity amplification, Hashimoto et al. (2018)
propose a robust optimization technique that seeks low loss
for worst-case group assignments Z (assuming a minimum
group size).
This SCM suggests several interesting interventions:
1. Intervention on latent dynamics: do(fλ → fˆλ) repre-
sents an intervention on population dynamics, which
we could use to test how policies affect the entry and
exit of various groups from the environment over time.
do(bk = bˆk) is a simple atomic intervention of a simi-
lar flavor, which changes the expected number of indi-
viduals entering each group at a given time step.
2. Intervention on group distributions: do(Pk → Pˆk)
shifts the distribution over input-output pairs for group
k, which could be carried out at one or every time step.
We do not present experiments on this model, but include
it to suggest the types of analyses and extensions possible
for SCMs with increased complexity. See Appendix D for
more sophisticated models from the fairness in dynamical
systems literature represented as SCMs.
4. Related Work
Dynamical Fairness There has been work on modeling
the long-term dynamics of fairness in a range of potential
domains. Recently, the first paper to bring these issues to
light was Lum & Isaac (2016), discussing the bias feedback
loops which could arise in predictive policing systems, with
follow-up work by Ensign et al. (2018). Domains such as
hiring (Hu & Chen, 2018), loans (Mouzannar et al., 2019),
and recommender systems (Hashimoto et al., 2018; Boun-
touridis et al., 2019) have also been explored in this way.
Other related explorations have dealt with short-term dy-
namics (Liu et al., 2018) and strategic actions (Hu et al.,
2019; Milli et al., 2019). There is also a line of work study-
ing the long-term effects of affirmative action, with some
classic works from the economics literature (Coate & Loury,
7 Using held-out data for the predictions is expressible via a
small change to the SCM.
1993; Foster & Vohra, 1992), and more recent computer sci-
ence focused work (Kannan et al., 2019). On the theoretical
side, several general algorithms for improved fairness in
sequential decision-making have been characterized, with
work discussing bandits (Joseph et al., 2016), reinforcement
learning (Jabbari et al., 2017), and importance sampling
estimators (Doroudi et al., 2017). The work of D’Amour
et al. (2020)—which most closely relates to ours—studies
long-term outcomes for existing fair ML methods, empha-
sizing agents and environments as modeling primitives. Our
contributions can be seen as complementary, emphasizing
the role of causal modeling primitives within a dynamical
system, both in terms of estimation from observational tra-
jectories, and building expressive simulators for evaluating
agents and environments.
Causality Causal modeling has been used in a variety of
non-dynamic fair machine learning approaches. Work on
counterfactual fairness (Kusner et al., 2017) has considered
fairness definitions which encourage models to treat exam-
ples similarly to hypothetical situations where they were
from the other group. Some other works focus on learn-
ing fair policies from biased observational data (Madras
et al., 2019; Kusner et al., 2019) or on learning decision
rules which follow only causal paths deemed to be non-
discriminatory (Kilbertus et al., 2017; Nabi & Shpitser,
2018; Nabi et al., 2019). Another line of work interprets pre-
viously proposed fairness criteria from a causal perspective
(Zhang & Bareinboim, 2018a;b).
Outside of fairness, Everitt et al. (2019) propose using influ-
ence diagrams as a framework for understanding safety in
AI systems.
A
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(a) . Our SCM formulation of
the one-step dynamics.
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(b) An extension emphasizing
the role of the credit bureau.
Figure 4: Causal interpretation of lending scenario from Liu et al.
(2018). See Sections 3.2, 5 and 6 for discussion, and Table 1 in
Appendix C for symbol legend.
5. Off-Policy Evaluation and Selection
Given historical observations, how can we estimate the real-
world impact of deploying a new policy (e.g. one that incor-
porates fairness constraints)? This question motivates one of
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the key tasks required for improving long-term ML fairness:
off-policy evaluation. As noted in Sec. 2, here we must rely
on observational data since it is often unethical or unsafe to
test candidate policies in the world (e.g. an A/B test). In this
section, we demonstrate empirically that causal reasoning
improves off-policy evaluation from observational data.
In this experiment, we consider a scenario where the
bank has historical data from a profit-maximizing policy
(MAXPROF) and wishes to learn and estimate the quality
of an equal opportunity policy (EQOPP) before deploying
it (the off-policy estimation/learning problem). We use the
lending setting of Liu et al. (2018) under our SCM interpre-
tation8 (see Figure 4a for depiction and Appendix B for full
specification). The key (non-trivial) structural equations of
the SCM are:
X = fX(A,UX)
T = fT (X,A,UT )
Y = fY (X,A,UY )
(2)
which are the feature distribution, the historical treatment
policy, and the outcome distribution, respectively. The
change in individual score c, the bank’s utility u, and the
next-step score X˜ , are simple functions of the other vari-
ables: (c, u) = (c+, u+) if Y = 1 or (c−, u−) if Y = 0,
and X˜ = X+c (for constants c+, u+ > 0; c−, u− < 0). As
in Liu et al. (2018), we focus on threshold policies, which
are defined by group-specific thresholds τ , (τ0, τ1) that
offer loans to applicants of group j with score X if and only
if their credit score X > τj .
5.1. Procedure
In order to compute good thresholds τj for various lend-
ing policies (maximum profit, equal opportunity, etc.),
Liu et al. (2018) make a very strong assumption in
their method: that these underlying dynamics parameters
(fX , fT , fY , c+, c−, u+, u−) of the system are known. This
is stronger than just assuming the causal structure, as we do
in Fig. 4a. The causal structure implies the general func-
tional form for the data generating process. However, Liu
et al. (2018) assume not just the form but that the function
parameter values are known. In practice, these functions
8 Our aim in this Section is to demonstrate the additional capa-
bilities of causal modeling in this context, and not to adjudicate on
whether this choice of dynamics model is correct or appropriate
to the lending setting. In decision making problems with material
consequences for individuals and groups (such as lending), care
should be taken when incorporating sensitive group information
into a causal model. For example, the generative process studied
here includes a causal link from sensitive attribute (which repre-
sents race) to credit score. Although this is consistent with the
original paper and captures the statistics of the dataset, it could
also be subject to criticism around modeling race as a cause of
social position rather than being socially ascribed; see Benthall &
Haynes (2019) and Hanna et al. (2020) for further discussion.
will rarely be known, and must be estimated from observa-
tional data. Therefore any off-policy selection or learning
hinges on the quality of these estimates.
Some of these unknown parameters (e.g. u+, u−, fT ) are
easy to estimate from data. However, one in particular is
difficult: the outcome function Y = fY (X,A,UY ). To
understand why estimating fY from data is difficult, we
must note that Y is a causal quantity. Specifically, Y is a
potential outcome (Rubin, 2005): it is the probability of a
person repaying a loan were they to receive one.9 Estimating
Y is difficult because it is often missing: we only observe Y
when a loan was given in the observational data. Therefore,
straightforward estimates may be biased or high variance.
This difficulty of estimating Y propagates into the rest of
the problem; u and ∆ have the same issues: they are poten-
tial outcomes, only observed when the treatment is given
(T = 1). Therefore, choosing the policy thresholds—which
involves estimating (u,∆)—is inherently a causal problem.
Given a policy pi, we focus on computing an off-
policy estimator E(pi) ≈ Epdo(fT→pi) [u]. A simple esti-
mator can be derived via regression: first learn a func-
tion to approximate fReg(X,A) ≈ Epobs [u|X,A] in the
observational data; then apply this regression for ev-
ery individual where pi suggests giving the treatment:
EReg(pi) = Epobs(X,A)[fReg(X,A)|pi(X,A) = 1]. This is a
natural baseline in the absence of causal reasoning.
However, we can further improve this estimator. As noted
previously, u is missing from the observational data in a
biased way. Therefore, we can approach the off-policy
estimation problem as a missing data problem — an area
for which causal inference has developed a number of tools.
Crucially, the set {X,A} satisfies the backdoor criterion
from T to u in the SCM (see Fig. 4a). This justifies10 the
use of a doubly robust estimator as presented by Zhang et al.
(2012), an estimator that combines a regression-based and
an inverse-propensity estimator (Bang & Robins, 2005) to
reduce bias and variance.11 With Ci = 1[pi(Xi, Ai) = T ],
the estimator is
EDR = 1
n
n∑
i=1
[ Ci(pi)ui
P (Ci(pi) = 1|Xi, Ai)
− Ci(pi)− P (Ci(pi) = 1|Xi, Ai)
P (Ci(pi) = 1|Xi, Ai) fReg(Xi, Ai)
]
.
9 Using the notation of Rubin (2005), we could denote it as Y1.
10 We also rely on the assumptions of overlap (in this case
requiring a mildly stochastic historical policy) and consistency.
While these are typical in the causal inference literature, they may
be difficult to verify from observational data in some settings. See
Appendices A and B for further discussion.
11 The doubly robust estimator can also be interpreted as apply-
ing the regression estimator as a control variate to the importance
sampling estimator; see Dudík et al. (2011) for discussion.
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We can use an analogous estimator for ∆, where the same
backdoor criterion holds. To summarize, we took the fol-
lowing steps to derive the causal estimator:
1. We first recognized that u was implicitly a causal quan-
tity (a potential outcome).
2. We next examined the SCM to identify a set of vari-
ables which satisfied the backdoor criterion between T
and u.
3. We finally applied a specialized estimator from the
causal inference literature to improve performance.
5.2. Results
We generate observational data from the SCM in Figure 4a,
under a MAXPROF threshold policy. We then consider a new
policy piτ with per-group thresholds {τj} as its two parame-
ters. We compute the estimators EReg(piτ ) and EDR(piτ ) for
varying values of these thresholds. Figure 5 shows that the
causally motivated estimator EDR achieves lower off-policy
estimation error on both sensitive groups, across the thresh-
old range. Note the high estimation error of the baseline
EReg for low values of τ . This is because the historical
policy typically does not award loans to applicants with
low scores, meaning there are fewer data available for the
regression.
Ultimately, the goal of estimating these quantities is to im-
prove policy learning. We can formulate an objective which
trades off between utility and an equal opportunity term
δEqOpp = |P (T = 1|Y = 1, A = 0)− P (T = 1|Y = 1, A = 1)|.
The overall objective is Vpi = U − λδEqOpp. We hope
to maximize this, with some hyperparameter λ ∈ R
governing the tradeoff. We note that estimating δEqOpp
itself presents a challenging causal problem, since Y is
frequently unobserved. See Appendix A for details on this
estimation problem and the rest of this experiment.
Using the estimators presented above, we can construct an
off-policy estimate of Vpi. We search over the space of
two-threshold policies (one threshold per group) to find the
policy with the highest off-policy estimate of the objective
Figure 5: Comparing error of EReg and EDR (regression and dou-
bly robust) for off-policy estimation of Epi[u] from observational
data. The x-axis represents single threshold policies. Estimation
for ∆ yields similar results, since both variables are linear in Y .
Figure 6: Test set value of a fairness-utility objective using the
two off-policy estimators. Hyperparameter λ governs the tradeoff.
Higher values of the objective Vpi are better.
on a validation set. We then calculate the true value of Vpi on
a held-out test set, using the SCM simulator (as visualized
in Figure 4a and specified fully in Appendix B) to generate
the true potential outcomes. The estimator EDR that more
fully incorporates causal reasoning in the parameter esti-
mation finds a better objective value, ultimately yielding
an improved policy (see Fig. 6). We emphasize that this
improvement requires assumptions about causal structures,
but not precise knowledge of the system dynamics.
6. Extensions in Lending via Intervention
We now investigate the setting where both causal struc-
ture and dynamics are known (returning to the assumptions
made by Liu et al. (2018)), and emphasize the role of in-
terventions in building expressive simulators for dynamical
fairness settings. Thus we carry out “on policy” evaluations
that sample from the SCM directly. SCMs enable clearer
explication of underlying causal assumptions. This means
the framework is flexible: novel policy interventions extend
our model by modifying existing assumptions, or testing
our reliance on the assumptions we have already made. We
give two such examples, measuring: (a) the interaction of
the lender with other agencies; and (b) the sensitivity of
long-term outcomes to the lender’s modeling assumptions.
6.1. Multi-actor Experiments
Intervention by credit bureau Liu et al. (2018) conduct
experiments based on statistics of FICO credit scores as-
signed by the credit bureau TransUnion (Reserve, 2007).
We note that these credit score decisions themselves consti-
tute a policy; and moreover, the language of interventions
in the SCM framework allows us to characterize decisions
made by the credit bureau (rather than the bank) using the
same fairness and profit metrics as before.12 The credit
bureau enters the SCM by reinterpreting Xi as features re-
12Note that recent changes by the credit scoring bu-
reau Fair Isaac Corp. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/
fico-changes-could-lower-your-credit-score-11579780800)
can be characterized as such an intervention.
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Figure 7: Policy evaluation under credit bureau intervention
fˆXˆ(X) = min(X, τCB) with τCB = 600. Group score
change—formally E
p
do(f
Xˆ
→fˆ
Xˆ
,fT→fˆT ) [∆j ]—and institutional
profits—E
p
do(f
Xˆ
→fˆ
Xˆ
,fT→fˆT ) [U ]—are shown as functions of the
two group thresholds {τj} under several fairness constraints.
lated to creditworthiness of an individual, then introducing
Xˆi = fXˆ(Xi) as a score that is deterministically computed
by the agency from the features (See Fig. 4b). When fXˆ is
the identity function, we recover the original model. Policy
evaluation under double interventionMdo(fT→fˆT ,fXˆ→fˆXˆ)
captures the sensitivity of the bank’s decisions to the deci-
sions of the credit bureau (and vice versa).
Results Figure 7 shows the effect on the average util-
ity E[U ] and average per-group score change E[∆j ] of
a simple policy intervention by the credit bureau. The
intervention involves the bureau setting the minimum
score to 600 for all applicants via the structural equation
fˆXˆ(X) = min(X, 600). This intervention is unlikely in the
real world because it contradicts the profit incentives of
the bureau, which encourage well-calibrated scores. Nev-
ertheless, it coarsely captures a potential scenario where
an actor besides the bank seeks to encourage fair outcomes
in a group-blind way, since under the new scoring policy
minority applicants are more likely to receive loans. How-
ever, we see in Figure 7a that the average group outcome
for protected applicants (A = 1) worsens when the bank’s
group threshold τA=1 is below 600, since in this case its
policy offers loans to individuals who have good scores on
A
UA
X0
UX0
Y 0UY 0 T 0UT 0
u0
X1
UX1
Y 1UY 1 T 1UT 1
u1
X2
UX2
Y 2UY 2 T 2UT 2
u2
U
∆
N
|A|
Figure 8: Phrasing the model from Liu et al. (2018) as an SCM
enables a multi-step extension for measuring long-term impacts,
e.g., in the two-step version shown here.
paper but are unlikely to repay the loans. Interestingly, the
expected profit (Figure 7b) under credit bureau interven-
tion differs depending on the fairness criteria of the bank.
This is because each fairness criteria differently constrains
the relationship between the two thresholds {τA=0, τA=1}
(the protected group is A = 1), so the choice of fairness
criteria implicitly sets how many applicants with boosted
scores (X < 600, thus Xˆ = 600) are selected for loans.
DEMPAR is more sensitive to the credit bureau intervention
than EQOPP; it obeys a stricter fairness constraint and of-
fers more loans to applicants with boosted scores (who are
are unlikely to repay, and disproportionately belong to the
minority group).
6.2. Sensitivity Analysis of Long-term Outcomes
Sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum, 2014; Saltelli et al.,
2008)—the task of measuring how sensitive a system’s out-
put is to its various assumptions—is critical when engag-
ing in a complex modeling task. Since causal language
makes structural modeling assumptions explicit, it is a natu-
ral match for sensitivity analysis. Questions of robustness
are particularly important in long-term, dynamic modeling,
since small assumptions errors can have large effects down-
stream when propagated over time. In this section, we show
how to conduct a long-term sensitivity analysis of the Liu
et al. (2018) model with SCMs, probing how sensitive pro-
posed policies may be to underlying causal assumptions.
We cast the sensitivity analysis as an on-policy evaluation
under an intervention that accounts for model mismatch.13
Long-term impacts Given a policy whose one-step effect
is purportedly fair, what can we say about its longer-term
impacts? The modularity of the SCM formulation allows
13 “Mismatch” refers here to structural equations with misspeci-
fied functional forms, not incorrect assumptions of causal structure.
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Figure 9: Evaluating multi-step policy robustness to distribution shift for various choice of intervention distribution q. Sensitivity of
institutional utility—formally |Eq[U ]− E[U ]|—and sensitivity of group avg. score change—formally |Eq[∆j ]− E[∆j ]|—are shown as a
function of steps. Expected profit is relatively robust to both interventions, whereas the expected per-group score changes are relatively
more sensitive to these interventions.
us to easily estimate these effects. For example, the struc-
tural equation X˜ = fX˜(X,Y, T ) can be modified to the
recursive update Xt+1 = fXt>0(Xt, Y t, T t). Note that Xt
(which does not directly depend on A) is only computed in
this way for steps t > 0, since the original scores X0 are
sampled from p(X0|A). On the other hand, since T t and
Y t still depend on A ∀ t, we see that group membership
does indeed have a long-term influence on the outcomes and
score trajectories for individuals.
Results We conduct our sensitivity analyses as simula-
tions of policy interventions under varying underlying model
assumptions. We analyze the sensitivity of the EQOPP
policy to two forms of model mismatch. In the first,
do(fT → fˆEOT ) recomputes the per-group thresholds under
the EQOPP constraint, but using incorrect statistics from the
credit bureau. In particular, the marginal p(Y |X) was used
for both group’s repayment probabilities rather than the cor-
rect p(Y |X,A). The second intervention do(fY → fˆY )
is more severe, as p(Y |X) is used to sample potential
outcomes Y rather than just set the thresholds within fT .
We measure error under each intervention relative to the
“ground truth” baseline where the correct potential outcome
distributions are used to set thresholds and sample data.
We measure how these errors compound over time (Fig-
ure 9). We observe the institutional profits are surprisingly
robust to both forms of intervention, while the per-group out-
comes are more sensitive to these interventions, especially
to do(fY → fˆY ). These results indicate that our policies
are particularly sensitive to assumptions around outcome
prediction for the sensitive groups.
7. Discussion
In this paper, we discuss causal modelling as a unifying
framework for the literature on fairness in dynamical sys-
tems. We demonstrate that in the realistic situation where
the dynamics parameters of these systems are not known,
causal models are helpful for estimating these parameters,
and evaluating and learning policies in an off-policy manner
from historical data. Additionally, we show how a causal
model can be used as a simulator when the parameters are
known, and how the modularity of the SCM framework
is helpful for both expressing natural extensions existing
work from the literature, and running long-term sensitivity
analyses of policy decisions.
Since a causal DAG can be thought of as an expressive
simulator, standard tools for optimization/learning in com-
putation graphs (Schulman et al., 2015) can be brought to
bear in order to learn policies that capture optimal rewards
across many interventional settings. Using gradient estima-
tors to learn policies in this setting holds promise in scaling
to high dimensional datasets, which we leave for future
work.
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A. Experimental Details for Off-Policy Evaluation and Selection
Here, we discuss details on the setup for the off-policy evaluation experiment in Sec. 5.
A.1. Data Generation
We generate data from the Liu et al. (2018) model, described in full in Appendix B. We use (c+, c−) = (75,−150) and
(u+, u−) = (1,−4). We use a single threshold policy of τj = 620∀ j. We generate 13 data sets of 10, 000 examples each,
using 11 for training (to get confidence intervals), 1 for validation, and 1 for test.
In order to use re-weighting estimators, we must have overlap i.e. each point (X,A) must have a non-zero probability of
receiving each treatment in the observational data. Since a threshold policy does not satisfy this, we flipped the treatment
chosen by the threshold policy with a probability of 0.1.
A.2. Treatment and Outcome Models
We use L2-regularized logistic regression for both the treatment and the outcome model using the liblinear default solver
in sklearn. We train a treatment and outcome model on each of the 11 training sets, and use these to construct our confidence
intervals.
A.3. Estimation of Equal Opportunity Distance
We define the equal opportunity metric δEqOpp as
δEqOpp = |P (T = 1|Y = 1, A = 0)− P (T = 1|Y = 1, A = 1)|. (3)
The key unit in this expression is P (T = 1|Y = 1) (removing A = a from the right side for clarity). This is non-trivial to
estimate, since Y is unobserved for many cases.
We take the following approach. First, using Bayes rule, we have
P (T = 1|Y = 1) = P (Y = 1|T = 1)P (T = 1)
P (Y = 1)
. (4)
P (T = 1) is easy to estimate from observational data. P (Y = 1|T = 1) is the off-policy estimation question —
we use either EReg or EDR to estimate this. We estimate P (Y = 1) using off-policy estimation as well, noting that
P (Y = 1) = P (Y = 1|T˜ = 1), if T˜ ⊥ Y . Therefore, we can obtain an estimate for the marginal distribution of Y by doing
off-policy estimation for random policies T˜ (again, using either EReg or EDR). We choose 10 random Bernoulli policies to
obtain 10 estimates of P (Y = 1) and average them.
A.4. Threshold Search
In both the estimation (Fig. 5) and selection (Fig. 6) experiments, we consider all thresholds14 τ ∈ [300, 850) in increments
of 5. To choose our best thresholds in the selection experiment, we consider all pairs of group-specific thresholds (τ0, τ1),
and estimate the value of Vpi for the policy associated with those thresholds. We find the optimal value on the validation
set, and test them to obtain a final value on the test set, Since we do not require overlap to hold in the target policy, we
consider hard threshold policies (we do not flip any predictions post-hoc, as we do in the observational data). In the selection
experiment, we test λ in increments of 0.1 from 0 to 0.9.
B. Liu et al. (2018) SCM Details
As briefly discussed above, Liu et al. (2018) propose a one-step feedback model for a decision-making setting then analyze
several candidate policies—denoted by the structural equation fT in our analysis—by simulating one step of dynamics to
compute the institution’s profit and group outcomes for each policy. Figure 4a shows our SCM formulation of this dynamics
model. Here we provide expressions for the specific structural equations used. Throughout, we make the assumption that
our model and its associated counterfactuals are representative of the observed data — this is termed as the consistency
14 300 and 850 are the minimum and maximum credit scores in the dataset
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assumption, and is described by Pearl (2010) as
P (Yx = y|Z = z,X = x) = P (Y = y|Z = z,X = x) (5)
for all x, y, z, where Yx is the counterfactual potential outcome for Y under the treatment x.
To sample over p(X,A) we start with Bernoulli sampling of A, parameterized SCM-style like
UAi ∼ Bernoulli(UAi |θ); Ai = fA(UAi) , UAi (6)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of the A = 1 group.
We then sample scores by the inverse CDF trick15. Given an inverse cumulative distribution function CDF−1j for each group
j ∈ {0, 1}, we can write
UXi ∼ Uniform(UXi |[0, 1]) (7)
Xi = fX(UXi , Ai) , CDF−1Aj (UXi) (8)
Liu et al. (2018) discuss implementing threshold policies for each group j ∈ {0, 1}, which are parameterized by thresholds
cj and tie-breaking Bernoulli probabilities γ (for simplicity of exposition we assume the tie-breaking probability is shared
across groups). The original expression was
P(T = 1|X,A = j) =

1 X > cj
γ X = cj
0 X < cj .
(9)
Then, after denoting by 1(·) the indicator function, we can rephrase this distribution in terms of a structural equation
governing treatment:
UTi ∼ Bernoulli(UTi |γ) (10)
Ti = fT (UTi , Xi, Ai)
, 11(Xi>cAi ) · U1(Xi=cAi )Ti · 01(Xi<cAi ). (11)
A policy fT (which itself may or may not satisfy some fairness criteria) is evaluated in terms of whether loans were given
to creditworthy individuals, and in terms of whether each demographic group successfully repaid any allocated loans
on average. To capture the notion of creditworthiness, we introduce a potential outcome Y (repayment if the loan were
given) for each individual, which is drawn16 from p(Y |X,A)17. By convention T = 1 as the “positive” treatment (e.g.,
got loan) and Y = 1 as the “positive” outcome (e.g., would have repaid loan if given) Note that Y is independent of
T given X , meaning Y is really an indicator of potential success. Formally, the potential outcome Y is distributed as
Yi ∼ Bernoulli(Yi|ρ(Xi, Ai)) for some function ρ : X ×A→ [0, 1]. We reparameterize this as a structural equation using
the Gumbel-max trick18 (Gumbel & Lieblein, 1954; Maddison et al., 2014):
UYi ∼ Uniform(UYi |[0, 1]) (12)
Yi = fY (UY , Xi, Ai) , 1
(
log
ρ(Xi, Ai)
1− ρ(Xi, Ai) + log
UY
1− UY > 0
)
. (13)
15 This standard trick is used for sampling from distributions with know densities. Recalling that CDFp : X → [0, 1] is a monotonic
(invertible) function representing CDFp(X ′) =
∫X′
−∞ dXp(X < X
′). Then to sample X ′ ∼ p we first sample U ∼ Uniform(U |[0, 1])
then compute X ′ = CDF−1p (U).
16 The authors denoted by ρ(x) the probability of potential success at score X . Various quantities were then computed,
e.g., u(x) = u+ρ(x) + u−(1 − ρ(x)). We observe that this is equivalent to marginalizing over potential outcomes u(x) =
Ep(Y |X) [u+Y + u−(1− Y )]; in our simulations we compute such expectations via Monte Carlo sampling with values of Y explicitly
sampled.
17 The authors use ρ(X) = p(Y |X) in their analysis (suggesting that potential outcome is independent of group membership
conditioned on score) but ρ(X,A) = p(Y |X,A) in the code, i.e. the potential outcome depends differently on score for each group. The
SCM as expressed in Figure 4a represents the codebase version.
18 This trick reparameterizes a Categorical or Bernoulli sample as a deterministic transformation of a Uniform sample. See Oberst &
Sontag (2019) for discussion of how to perform counterfactual inference for SCMs with Categorical random variables.
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The institutional utility ui and the updated individual score X˜i are deterministic functions of the outcome Yi and the
treatment Ti, and the original score Xi:
ui = fu(Yi, Ti) ,
{
u
1(Yi)=1
+ · u1(Yi)=0− if Ti = 1
0 else
, (14)
X˜i = fX˜(Xi, Yi, Ti) ,
{
Xi + c
1(Yi)=1
+ · c1(Yi)=0− if Ti = 1
Xi else
. (15)
As mentioned in Section 5, {u+, u−, c+, c−} are fixed parameters that encode expected gain/loss in utility/score based on
payment/default of loan.
There are two global quantities of interest. Firstly, the institution cares about its overall utility at the current step (ignoring
all aspects of the future), expressed as
U = fU (u1...N ) , 1
N
N∑
i=1
ui. (16)
Secondly, to understand the societal impact of the lending policy, we measure the average per-group score change induced
by the policy, expressed for group A = j as
∆j = f∆j (X1...N , X˜1...N , A1...N ) ,
1
NAj
N∑
i=1
(X˜i −Xi)1(Ai=j), (17)
with NAj ,
∑
i′ 1(Ai′ = j) is the size of the Aj = 1 group.
C. Symbol Legends
Symbol Meaning
N Number of individuals
|A| Number of demographic groups
Ai Sensitive attribute for individual i
UAi Exogenous noise on sensitive attribute for individual i
Xi Score for individual i
UXi Exogenous noise on score for individual i
Yi Potential outcome (loan repayment/default) for individual i
UYi Exogenous noise on potential outcome for individual i
Ti Treatment (institution gives/withholds loan) for individual i
UTi Exogenous noise on treatment for individual i
ui Utility of individual i (from the institution’s perspective)
∆i Expected improvement of score for individual i
X˜i Score for individual i after one time step
U Global utility (from institution’s perspective)
∆j Expected change in score for group j
Table 1: Symbol legend for Figure 4a
Here we provide the following symbol decoders for SCMs expressed in the main paper:
• Table 1 decodes the symbols used in Figure 4a
• Table 2 decodes the symbols used in Figure 3
D. Other SCMS
Here we provide some SCMs for some additional papers from the literature:
Causal Modeling for Fairness in Dynamical Systems
• Figure 10 describes the multi-step loan setting discussed by Mouzannar et al. (2019). Their model is similar to the one
proposed by Liu et al. (2018). The main difference is that Mouzannar et al. (2019) describes dynamics that unfold
exclusively at the population level, where decisions rendered by the institution do not affect the future well-being of the
individuals themselves.
• Figure 11 corresponds to the news recommender simulator discussed by Bountouridis et al. (2019). The goal of this
simulator was to understand the long-term effects of recommender algorithms on news consumption behaviors.
• Figure 12 shows the hiring market model proposed in Hu & Chen (2018). Figure 12a shows the higher-level structure
of the model: a global state of the hiring market Θ progresses through time, a cohort of workers are initialized at each
time step with attributes Φ set by the current global state, and the cohorts progress through time, feeding back into the
global state at each step.
Figure 12b shows the structure of each individual/cohort’s journey through the labour market. At the top of Figure 12b,
we see the variables which constitute the global state Θ: wages w, reputation Πµ of group µ, and the proportion of
“good” workers on the permanent labour market in group µ, gµ. The bottom plate of Figure 12b shows the variables
which are part of Φ and which correspond to attributes of an individual worker’s experience.
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Figure 10: SCM for the group dynamics model proposed by Mouzannar et al. (2019). See Table 4 for a description of each symbol.
Symbol Meaning
k indexes groups
Pk distribution over (X,Y ) for group k
bk expected group-k baseline population growth at each step
λtk expected population for group k at time t
αtk mixing coeff for group k at time t
N t Total population at time t
Ztk indicator of individual belonging to k-th group
Xt input features for an individual at time t
Y t label for an individual at time t
U tθ Exogenous noise in learning algo. (e.g., random seed)
θt Estimated classifier parameters at time t
Yˆ t Predicted label for an individual at time t
Rtk Classification error for group k at time t (unobserved)
Table 2: Symbol legend for Figure 3
Causal Modeling for Fairness in Dynamical Systems
u0
a0
d0
r0
U0reco
k δ β
v0
w0
λ θ′ θ
c0
z0
U0choice
U1drift
p
u1 θ∗
a1
d1
r1
U1reco
k δ β
v1
w1
λ θ′ θ
c1
z1
U1choice
U2drift
p
u2 θ∗
a2
d2
r2
U2reco
k δ β
v2
w2
λ θ′ θ
c2
z2
U2choice
|U|
|A|
|U|
|A|
|U|
|A|
Figure 11: SCM for the news recommendation simulator model proposed by Bountouridis et al. (2019). The key dynamic modeling
is in the user vectors in topic space, which drift over time towards the articles that are consumed (these in turn partially depend on the
recommendations). Articles are also modeled as decaying in popularity in time. See Table 5 for explanation of all symbols.
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(a) Macro-level DAG showing how market state Θt and worker
cohorts Φtj dynamically affect one another
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(b) Micro-level DAG isolating how market state Θt affects
investment and effort levels of a single worker cohort, and how
worker choices affect market state at the next step
Figure 12: SCM for the hiring model from Hu & Chen (2018). 12a shows macro-level causal assumptions. At step t the global state Θt of
the PLM affects the choices of all cohorts of workers (a cohort denotes workers that enter the market at the same step) via wage signals
(12b). The choices of investment and effort and resulting outcomes in turn affect the workers themselves in terms of hiring decisions, and
the global state of the market in terms of average group reputation and performance per group. Teal arrows denote structural functions
going into the global state. Orange arrows denote structural functions going into the cohort state. Black arrows denote structural functions
within the cohort state. See Table 3 in Appendix C for explanation of all symbols.the dynamics.
D.1. Symbols for Figures in Supplemental Material
Here we provide the following symbol decoders for SCMs expressed in the Appendices:
• Table 3 decodes the symbols used in Figure 12
• Table 4 decodes the symbols used in Figure 10
• Table 5 decodes the symbols used in Figure 11
Causal Modeling for Fairness in Dynamical Systems
Symbol Meaning
t indexes time
i indexes individuals
j indexes cohorts
wt wages at time t
gtµ proportion “good” group-µ workers in PLM
Πtµ group µ reputation at time t
µi group membership for worker i
θi individual i ability
ci cost of investment for individual i
ηi investment level for individual i
ρi qualification level for individual i
ei individual-i cost of effort
ti individual-i actual effort exerted at time t
oti individual-i outcome at time t
hi was individual hired to TLM following education?
Ht−τ :t−1i individual-i τ -recent history (outcomes and TLM/PLM status)
piti individual i reputation at time t
pti was individual hired to PLM at step t?
Table 3: Symbol legend for Figure 12
Symbol Meaning
Ai Sensitive attribute for individual i
UAi Exogenous noise on sensitive attribute for individual i
|A| Number of demographic groups
Vi Qualification for individual i
UVi Exogenous noise on qualification for individual i
|V| Number of qualification levels
θtj Bernoulli parameter of qualifications of group j at time t
N Number of individuals
Ti “Treatment” (whether the institution gives loan) for individual i
UTi Exogenous noise on treatment for individual i
ui Utility of individual i (from the institution’s perspective)
βtj,v Selection rate for group j members with qual. v at step t
U Global institutional utility
Table 4: Symbol legend for Figure 10
Symbol Meaning
User

uti i-th user topic vector at step t
θ Awareness decay with user-article distance
θ′ Awareness decay with article prominence
λ Prominent vs proximity in awareness computation
w Max awareness pool size for any user
k i-th user’s sensitivity to article proximity in awareness computation
θ∗i i-th user’s sensitivity to article proximity in drift computation
s number of articles read per user per step
U tdrift,i Exogenous noise on user i’s drift at step t
|U| Number of users
Article

aj j-th article topic vector
z0j initial prominence of article j (possibly shared across topic)
ztj prominence of article j at step t
p prominence (linear) decay factor
|A| Number of articles
User-article

dti,j distance between user ui and article aj at step t
vti,j computed step-t distance (user ui, article aj) in awareness computation
cti,j computed step-t choice of user ui about article aj
U tchoice,i,j Exogenous noise on user i’s choice of article j at step t
Recommender

m Number of articles recommended to each user at each step
κti,j Rank of recommendation of article j to user i at step t
δ Base amount of salience boost induced by a recommendation
β Rank-decay of salience induced by a recommendation
U treco Exogenous (possibly observed) noise in the recommender algo at step t
d Number of steps in the simulation
Table 5: Symbol legend for Figure 11
